Differences in tax rates over time induce tax payers to shift income between periods. This intertemporal shifting behavior affects the excess burden of the tax system and creates a bias in empirical estimates using tax reforms to identify the long run, structural elasticity of taxable income. We provide strong empirical evidence of large, widespread intertemporal shifting responses in wage income. Our empirical analysis is based on new monthly payroll records for all Danish employees. The identifying variation is provided by a large tax reform that significantly reduced the marginal tax rates for the 1/3 of full-time employees with the highest incomes. The reform was announced in March 2009 and implemented in 2010 thereby giving employees sufficient time to arrange for shifting of income. Income shifting required employee-employer collaboration but did not conflict with the tax law, and is therefore a classic example of tax avoidance. In our analysis, income shifting accounts for 3/4 of the overall elasticity of taxable income. The elasticity of taxable income is increasing in income, as documented by many previous studies, but this increase is explained entirely by an increase in income shifting in proportion to income. Although survey evidence indicates that nine out of ten in the population are unaware of the tax avoidance opportunity, our results suggest that individuals with high income and opportunities to shift are significantly more aware of the possibility.
Differences in tax rates over time induce tax payers to shift income between periods. This intertemporal shifting behavior affects the excess burden and distributional impact of the tax system, and creates a bias in empirical estimates using tax reforms to identify the long run, structural elasticity of taxable income and thereby quantifying the efficiency loss from taxation (Slemrod, 1998 Our analysis provides clear graphical evidence of income shifting. By computing the differences between post-announcement and pre-announcement reported monthly earnings, we observe a clear negative spike in the last months of 2009, followed by a positive spike in the beginning of 2010, when comparing the treatment group of high-income individuals to a control group of middle-income individuals with only small changes in incentives. We detect no systematic effects in other months, including December 2010/January 2011, confirming that our results are driven by income shifting.
The large spikes around New Year 2010 are difficult to reconcile with models of real behavior, strongly suggesting that the observed movement in income is due to tax avoidance rather than real responses (Slemrod, 1995) . When looking overall at the high-income employees, we find that the average level of reported wage income is five percent lower in December 2009 and five percent higher in January 2010, revealing large shifting effects even at the macro level. On the other hand, given that it was not illegal to shift income, it would be natural from economic theory to expect even larger effects.
This indicates that some types of optimizing frictions are crucial for our observed shifting behavior, in line with the conclusions in Chetty et al. (2011) and Chetty (2012) that optimizing frictions are important for understanding income and labor supply responses to taxation.
The aggregate shifting response masks substantial heterogeneity. With more than 2 million individuals observed monthly over three years and detailed socio-economic background variables, we are able to shed further light on the anatomy of shifting behavior and the underlying frictions. First, the share of income shifting out of income is steadily increasing in the income level with 15 percent of average monthly wage income being shifted around New Year 2010 for the top 10 percent of wage earners and around 30 percent for the top 1 percent of wage earners, indicating that shifting costs do not increase with the size of the incentive to shift income. Second, among the government employees in the treatment group we find no evidence of shifting, which emphasizes the role of employee-employer collaboration and firm willingness for the possibility of shifting income. Third, we conducted a telephone survey among randomly selected individuals in the working-age population in order to study the degree of information/inattention among workers. The survey evidence reveals that less than 10 percent of workers understand the shifting incentive and at the same time believe that shifting would be legal. However, although the awareness of the shifting possibilities is limited in the overall population, the survey and evidence of shifting suggest that individuals with high income and opportunities to shift (e.g. individuals working in the private sector) are much more aware of the shifting possibilities.
[We are currently studying the importance of credit constraints, tax payer information proxied by tax payers who have given accountants access to their tax information, firm size, top executives, family ties etc.] Danish tax return records have recently been used to provide some of the most compelling evidence of behavioral effects to taxation with respect to income responses, labor supply behavior and tax evasion (Chetty et al, 2011; Kleven et al., 2011; Kleven and Schultz, 2012) . Our empirical results complements these findings by providing novel evidence of tax avoidance in the form of intertemporal shifting of wage income where existing knowledge is limited. Empirical analyses have detected strong intertemporal shifting effects in capital income due to retiming of capital gains (e.g. Auerbach, 1998) and in taxable income of executives due to timing in the realization of stock options (Goolsbee, 2000) .
The study by Goolsbee looked at the five highest-paid employees in US public companies, giving a dataset with annual income of 6,133 top executives, and their responses to the marginal tax rate increase implemented in 1993 by President Clinton. In this data, Goolsbee found little responsiveness of salary and bonuses to the tax hike. This is in contrast to Sammartino and Weiner (1997) who found evidence in aggregate data of time-adjustments in bonuses due to OBRA 1993. A reason for this discrepancy may be that it is easier and more valuable for top executives to change the timing of the realization of stock options than bonuses, while other high-income individuals, who do not have stock options, instead focus their effort on the timing of bonuses. Our results provide some support to this conjecture.
Our results are relevant for the blooming literature, pioneered by Feldstein (1995) and recently surveyed by Saez et al. (2012) , using tax reforms to estimate the elasticity of taxable income (ETI).
If tax payers temporarily shift income from a period with a high tax rate to a period with a low tax rate then this effect enters into the empirical estimate of the ETI, thereby creating a biased estimate of the underlying structural elasticity. This problem is well-known in the literature (see Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012) and Goolsbee (2000) found evidence of a large bias in his data on top executives. (2010), compared to the larger elasticities found when using income variation generated by tax reforms for identification.
Our result showing large intertemporal shifting responsiveness may also carry implications for optimal tax policy and the design of tax reforms. In practise, most tax payers will experience lifetime variation in marginal tax rates (because of retirement, marriage, unemployment etc.) and from an optimal tax perspective there may be good arguments for age-dependency in tax rates (e.g. Blomquist, S. and L. Micheletto, 2008). On the other hand, shifting behavior will, ceteris paribus, call for less variation in tax rates over the lifetime. In the design of tax reforms, it may be important to take the possibility of shifting responses caused by a tax reform into account. Often a tax reform is replaced by a new reform a few years later, for example Denmark has had 6 tax reforms within the last 25 years, implying that income shifting effects may be more important than the estimated 'permanent effects' often in focus when designing tax reforms. Section 2 describes the Danish 2010 tax reform and the incentive for income shifting generated by the reform. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents our very preliminary empirical results.
Finally, Section 5 describes how we plan to proceed with the analysis. The declared goal of the reform was to reduce taxation of labor income and thereby stimulate labor supply. The tax cut on labor income was financed primarily by decreasing the value of deductions (including interest payments), reducing business subsidies and increasing energy and environmental taxes, thereby keeping the government revenue constant (before behavioral responses).
The reform mainly reduced marginal tax rates on labor income for high-wage earners (our treatment group). In the income year 2009, high-wage earners with labor income (LI) above the top/middle tax income threshold of 377 thousand Danish kroner (DKK) faced a marginal tax rate of around 63 percent comprising of labor contributions (LC = 8% of LI), a regional tax (32.8% of LI-LC in the average municipality), a bottom tax (5.04% LI-LC), a middle tax (6% of LI-LC), a top tax (15% of LI-LC) and a church tax (0.7% of LI-LC on average). 2 The tax reform removed the middle tax and reduced the bottom tax to 3.67 percent implying that the marginal tax rate of high-wage earners (  ) was reduced to 56 percent, equivalent to a reduction in the after-tax rate, 1 −   , of close to 20 percent. Individuals with income just below the top/middle tax cutoff (our control group) did not pay the middle tax and the top tax, and faced therefore a marginal tax rate of 43.4 percent before the reform and 42.1 percent after the reform, corresponding to a reduction in the after-tax rate, 1 −   , of only 2 percent. 3 The incentive to shift income was also influenced by a change in the top/middle tax income cutoff, which was increased from 377 thousand DKK to 424 thousand DKK. Figure 
Limits to engage in shifting behavior
Shifting of labor income across years requires cooperation with the employer, who has to report the income earned to the tax authorities. The aim of the Danish legal rules concerning the payment of earnings and salaries is primarily to protect the employees from being exploited by firms, rather than to prevent workers and firms from engaging in tax avoidance by shifting income across years. The rules state that firms have to withhold taxes on the labor income of its employees, but no sooner than when the income is paid out to the employees. The company is obligated to withhold taxes no later than 6 months after the income is earned. Thus, labor income earned after July 1st can legally be shifted into the following income year. Obviously, this type of behavior is not intended by the tax reform and the tax laws, and it is therefore an example of tax avoidance. This implies that we should not expect to 3 These computations of the marginal tax rates would apply to the majority of tax payers. The top/middle tax cutoff depends also on the size of net capital income (excluding stock income) provided it is positive. However, the big majority of tax payers have negative capital income. Computations of marginal tax rates often involve complicated interactions between spouses (Immervoll et al., 2011) . Denmark has an individual-based tax system with a few elements of jointness. For example, when computing the middle tax, it is possible to transfer unutilized allowances across spouses, implying that some married persons with income in a certain range pay the top tax but not the middle tax.
observe any shifting activity among (federal) government employees, and maybe also companies who are afraid to behave in conflict with social norms because they are in the public eye and depend on public reputation.
Information and awareness
The opportunity to engage in tax shifting behavior was of course not advertised by the tax authorities.
There was, however, a fairly intense debate on the possibility of shifting earnings in the popular press, including countrywide newspapers and on the webpage of the two large public news channels (DR and TV2). In order to get a better understanding of the overall level of information and awareness in the population about the economic incentives to shift income and about the possibilities according to the law, we have included two questions in a telephone survey conducted in February 2010 for a random sample of the adult population in Denmark.
First, we asked each respondent if it would be most beneficial for them, from a tax point of view, to obtain a little more extra wage income 'just before the New Year 2010', 'just after the New Year 2010' or 'equally beneficial'. For almost all tax payers, it would be beneficial to receive the income after New Year, although the incentive is modest for individual with monthly income below DKK 32 thousand as described above. Second, we asked the respondent whether she perceived it to be 'legal' or 'illegal' for an employee to make an agreement together with the employer about postponing the payout of some of the earned income in 2009 to 2010. The average of the answers are shown in Table I . Clearly, many people are not aware of the economic incentive to shift income and the legal rules applying. Less than 1/4 of the respondents self-report that they have a tax incentive to shift income, only around 1/3 believe it is legal, and less than one out of ten indicate that they have an opportunity to avoid taxes through intertemporal shifting (the combination of answers 'After New Year' and 'Legal'). The new income register offers a unique possibility to study shifting behavior of wage income.
Intertemporal tax shifting is expected to take place around New Year. For example, employees and employers may determine to postpone payout of income earned by the end of the year or bonus payments to January. The monthly frequency of our data makes it possible to convincingly detect this shifting behavior, and with all tax payers in the data, we are able to shed more light on the overall importance and anatomy of this type of avoidance behavior. [The data is in the process of being transferred to Statistics Denmark where it may be combined with comprehensive social demographic background information of the employees as well as detailed information about firms.] 4 Empirical results
Overall evidence of shifting behavior
In order to identify intertemporal shifting behavior, we employ a standard difference-in-difference identification strategy. We focus on employees in the private sector with positive wage income in all years. We define the treatment group (T-group) as individuals with average monthly wage income above DKK 32,000 in 2008, and define the control group (C-group) as individuals with average monthly wage income in the range DKK 30,000-32,000. This gives 270 thousand individuals in the treatment group and a little more than 50 thousand individuals in the control group.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the development in monthly wage income of the T-group and C-group, respectively, both exhibiting the same seasonal variation as in the full sample of employees shown in 
Shifting behavior and the elasticity of taxable income
Intertemporal income shifting behavior is relevant for the literature, pioneered by Feldstein (1995) and recently surveyed by Saez et al. (2012) , using tax reforms to estimate the elasticity of taxable income.
If tax payers temporarily shift income from a period with a high tax rate to a period with a low tax rate then this effect enters into the empirical estimate of the elasticity of taxable income thereby creating an upward bias when trying to measure the underlying structural elasticity. This problem is well-known in the literature (see Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012) but only a single study by Goolsbee (2000) has been able to gauge the potential size of the upward bias. Goolsbee considered the changes in yearly income of 6,133 top executives due to the 1993 US tax reform, which raised marginal tax rates of high-income individuals. He concluded that most of the income variation of these top executives was generated by retiming in the realization of stock options, implying that most of the elasticity of taxable income was due to intertemporal income shifting rather than a high underlying structural elasticity.
With our data, it is possible to analyze whether this is a general phenomenon or just applies to few individuals who are in the very top of the earnings distribution and own stock options.
We start by carrying out a simple Feldstein type estimation of the elasticity of taxable income:
where the numerator is the percentage change in yearly income of the T-group from the year before the implementation of the reform to the year after implementation, and measured relative to the Cgroup. As may be seen from Figure 4 , Panel B this is equal to 105 + 064 = 169 percentage points.
The denominator is the percentage change in the after-tax rate ( Hence, the mean estimate indicates that more than 3/4 of the ETI is due to shifting behavior, and that the underlying 'structural' elasticity-after removing the shifting component-becomes less than 003. According to the confidence intervals of the estimates, shifting behavior explains 50-100 percent of the ETI.
Shifting behavior across the income distribution
A robust conclusion from the elasticity of taxable income literature is that estimates of ETI is increasing in the income level. From an optimal tax policy point of view, it is important to know whether this is due to temporary shifting effects or permanent income responses. The excess burden of the tax system and the limits to redistribution (the Laffer rate) are governed by the permanent income responses rather than the temporary shifting effects around reform implementation.
In Figure 5 , we consider the shifting response of high income groups compared to the same control group as before. Panel A shows the development of individuals with earnings in the percentiles 75 to 90 (P75-P90) of the overall income distribution described in Figure 3 . The ETI estimates for these four groups are increasing and equal to 011, 017, 021, 035, respectively, thereby consistent with previous findings. However, the analysis strongly indicates that this increase in the elasticity is explained entirely by shifting. For example, for the two highest income groups, the estimate of the shifting elasticity is larger than the estimate of the ETI, suggesting that the underlying structural elasticity is close to zero.
Employee-employer corporation and robustness
In order to ensure that our identification of income shifting is not governed by job changes, job losses, income from temporary jobs or extra income from non-ordinary employee-employer relationships, we redo the basic analysis for individuals with 37 consecutive income observations (Jan09-Jan11)) at the same employer, and include only these 37 observations in the analysis. The left panel of Figure 6 (private sector employees) is comparable to Panel B in Figure 4 and the graphs are very similar.
If anything, the shifting effect is somewhat larger now. This confirms that shifting occurs in main occupations with long employee-employer relationships.
In Panel B, we carry out the same analysis with government employees instead of private sector employees. As described in Subsection 2.2, we should not expect to see income shifting among (federal) government employees because of the need to collaborate with the employer, who reports wages and salaries to the tax agency, in order to carry out the tax avoidance strategy. This is confirmed by the graph where income is basically constant around New Year in all three years, thus revealing no evidence of shifting behavior.
 Figure 6 
We have tried to change the income threshold dividing the treatment group and the control group from DKK 32,000 to DKK 35,000, and have tried to include individuals with income in the range 25,000-30,000 in the control group. These changes had negligible quantitative impact on any of the results.
Work in progress
The data is in the process of being transferred to Statistics Denmark where it will be combined with comprehensive social demographic background information of the employees as well as detailed information about firms. This will enable us to shed further light on the anatomy of shifting behavior and the underlying frictions. We plan to study:
• The role of information of the employee: (i) We will combine the wage data with the survey data used in Subsection 2.3 in order to see if the survey indicators of information and awareness are able to predict shifting behavior.
(ii) Some tax payers have given accountants permission to make correction in their tax return. We are working to get this information.
• The role of credit constraints: We will use information on households marginal interest rates and size of liquid assets in proportion to income (often used in studies of consumption behavior).
• Importance of firm type/organization: Firm size, firm control (top executives), self-employed...
• Importance of network effects: clustering, family ties, colleagues ... 
Private sector employees
Note: The graphs are based on individuals with 37 consecutive observations (Jan09-Jan11)) at the same employer, and include only these 37 observations in the analysis. The left panel focuses on private sector employees as in the remaining analysis, and is comparable to Panel B in Figure 4 , while the right panel is a similar analysis with only public sector employees in the treatment group and in the control group, using the same income thresholds as before to define the two groups. 
